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Abstract 
The U.S. house price boom has been linked to an unsustainable easing of mortgage credit 
standards. However, standard time series models of US house prices omit credit constraints 
and perform poorly in the 2000’s. We incorporate data on credit constraints for first time 
buyers into a model of US house prices based on the (inverted) demand for housing services. 
The model yields not only a stable long-run cointegrating relationship, a reasonable speed of 
adjustment, plausible income and price elasticities and an improved fit, but also sensible 
estimates of tax credit effects and the possible bottom in real house prices. 
 
JELClassifications: R31, G21, E51, C51, C52. 
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The recent U.S. house price boom and bust has been linked to an unsustainable easing of 
credit standards (Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy (2010, 2011) and Geanakoplos (2010) inter 
alia).  In the international literature, shifts in credit standards play an important role in explaining 
shifts in housing demand, consistent with theory (Cameron et al., 2006; Meen, 2001; Muellbauer 
and Murphy, 1997).  Nevertheless, standard U.S. house price models omit credit constraints and 
perform poorly in the 2000s (Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy, 2011; Gallin 2006).  This paper 
incorporates data on credit constraints into a time series model of U.S. house prices based on the 
inverted demand function for housing services.  We estimate the model from 1981 to 2009, 
which includes the recent bust.  In contrast to standard models, our model yields not only stable 
long-run relationships, reasonable speeds of adjustment, plausible income and price elasticities, 
and better model fits, but also sensible estimates of tax credit effects and the bottom in real house 
prices. 
This paper improves upon the limited literature on the bust and boom of U.S. house 
prices in two other ways.  First, the time series literature on recent national house prices has been 
limited to showing the inadequacy of standard approaches (Gallin, 2006) or has used data on 
credit constraints to model the boom, but not yet the bust, using price-to-rent models (Duca, 
Muellbauer and Murphy, 2011).  Second, we depart from the widely used price-to-rent approach 
to modeling U.S. house prices by using a model of the demand for housing services, a competing 
approach which is popular in the international literature.  Inverting the demand function implies 
that house prices are a function of income, user costs, housing supply and credit constraints inter 
alia.  Modeling house price booms should be robust both to (1) modeling the unwinding of 
unsustainable house price increases and (2) using the finance/arbitrage based price-to-rent 
approach or the consumer-theory based inverted demand approach.  A priori it is unclear which 
approach is better and, for robustness, we have used each in a series of different studies.   
 3
The inverted demand approach to modeling house prices has a number of advantages 
over relying only on the price-to-rent approach. First, the latter assumes that rental and owner-
occupied housing are perfect substitutes, even though the land component of these two types of 
properties typically differs.  Second, rents may be out of equilibrium and may indirectly reflect 
fundamental drivers of housing demand that are worth tracking in inverted demand models.  
Third, there is much government intervention in rental markets outside of the U.S., which 
undermines the arbitrage assumptions of the price-to-rent approach. As a result, it is difficult to 
make international comparisons using price-to-rent models of house prices and say whether or 
not the US housing market behaves differently from the markets in Britain, Ireland and Spain, 
for example.  Fourth, it is important to see whether some earlier findings on the house price 
boom that rely on the price-to-rent approach are robust to using a different framework.  
We use updated data from Duca, Johnson, Muellbauer and Murphy (2010) on average loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios for first-time home-buyers, the marginal buyers most affected by credit 
constraints.  This series, which spans the period 1979 to 2009, is derived from the American 
Housing Survey.  We argue that the adjusted, first-time buyer LTV series captures exogenous 
shifts in credit standards. Consistent with a weakening of credit standards during the subprime 
boom, the LTVs for first-time homebuyers are positively correlated with the share of mortgages 
outstanding that were securitized into private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBSs, Figure 
1).  MBSs issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac usually securitized conforming loans, which 
met credit standards applied to most mortgages in earlier years. In contrast, nonprime mortgages 
were mainly funded by being packaged into “private label” MBSs because they did not conform 
to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac standards, or were too risky to be held by regulated banks (Credit 
Suisse, 2007).  Because our LTV series reflects credit standards on new mortgages 
(originations), it leads the private MBS share of the stock of home mortgages by about two years.  
In addition, the rise of the LTV ratio through the mid-2000’s coincided with a large rise in home-
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ownership, which was disproportionately concentrated in households under 29 years of age 
(Bardhan et. al, 2009, pp.7-8).  Because such households have limited savings, the timing is 
consistent with the interpretation that the rise of LTVs for first-time homebuyers in the early 
2000’s eased credit constraints for the marginal home-buyer, thereby bolstering the effective 
demand for housing.  This last aspect makes LTV ratios for first-time buyers less prone to 
endogeneity than house payment-to-income (PTI) ratios. PTI ratios are affected by shifts in 
interest rates and income, two other components of the inverted demand cointegrating vector, 
whereas we find that the LTV ratio, adjusted for changes in unemployment, is weakly exogenous 
in our vector error correction model. 
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The rise in LTV ratios over 2000-05 reflects two types of financial innovation that 
appeared to enable the risk in nonprime mortgages to be priced and such mortgages to be funded.  
One was credit scoring technology, which lenders increasingly used to sort and price nonprime 
mortgages, which had higher LTVs than conventional mortgages (Credit Suisse, 2007).  The 
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second innovation was the development of new structured mortgage products. Partly owing to 
regulatory concerns, subprime mortgages were not funded by being held in portfolio at banks. 
Instead, innovations in structured finance enabled such loans to be packaged into collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) or into private-label MBSs that insured investors from mortgage default 
risk with credit default swaps (CDSs).   
During the subprime boom, loans were extended to many borrowers with low down- 
payments and poor credit histories, who would have earlier been denied loans. Many nonprime 
loans were adjustable rate mortgages whose initial teaser interest rates benefited from very low 
Treasury interest rates over 2001–2003. The house-price rises, set in train by these credit-supply 
and interest-rate changes, enabled nonprime borrowers who faced difficulty paying their 
mortgages to either pay off their mortgages by selling their homes or to borrow more against 
appreciated values. However, fundamentals changed from 2003-2004 onwards as interest rates 
returned to more ‘normal’ levels and high rates of building expanded the housing stock. House 
prices became increasingly overvalued. With the slowing of the pace of house price appreciation, 
the extent of bad loans became clearer and with the reassessment of loan quality fundamentals, 
the supply of credit for all types of mortgages contracted. Specifically, large unexpected loan 
losses overwhelmed the ability of CDO’s to protect investment-grade tranches from higher 
nonprime mortgage defaults (Duca et al., 2010).  These losses induced jumps in the cost of using 
CDS protection that made subprime mortgage pools too costly to insure.  Subprime mortgage 
funding and originations fell, as reflected by declines in the share of all outstanding mortgages 
packaged into private-label MBSs (Figure 1). As a result, LTVs for first-time home buyers fell, 
lowering the effective demand for housing and inducing an unwinding of earlier rises in house 
prices.  
 Adding LTV data on first time home-buyers improves house price models in important 
ways.  First, doing so yields more stable long-run relationships, more sensible estimated income 
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and price elasticities, better speeds of adjustment, and better model fits.  Second, this occurs in 
samples before LTVs rose in the subprime mortgage boom as an earlier, modest rise in LTV 
ratios enables us to identify such an effect.  In another study, we find that adding data on LTVs 
and regional housing stocks qualitatively improves regional home price models, paralleling the 
UK regional results of Cameron, Muellbauer and Murphy (2006).  
           This outline of recent history and these empirical findings are in line with Geanakoplos 
(2010) who argues that leverage cycles play an important causal role in driving booms and busts 
of asset prices. The prime measure of leverage for households is the LTV and Geanakoplos 
gathers data on LTVs for private label subprime and alt-prime mortgages.  He shows that, for the 
upper 50 percent of the distribution of such LTVs, the mean LTV rose strongly from 2000, 
peaked in 2006Q2 and by 2009 had plunged below levels experienced in 2000.  His data do not 
distinguish first-time buyers and are not representative of the entire private sector mortgage 
market. But they corroborate the overall picture presented in Figure 1 above. 
This study is organized as follows.  Section II presents our model of the inverted demand 
for housing services and section III the data.  Models are estimated using cointegration methods 
in Section IV. Section V simulates recent house prices, accounting for tax credits.  The 
conclusion reviews the empirical results and relates them to recent booms and busts in the U.S. 
mortgage and housing markets.  
 
II. House Price Models Using the Inverted Demand Approach   
Perhaps the simplest theory of what determines house prices is to treat supply—the stock 
of houses—as given in the short run, with prices driven by the inverted demand for housing 
services (h) that are proportional to the housing stock (hs). Let log housing demand be given by  
ln ln lnhs hp y zα β= − + +
        (1) 
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where hp =  real house price, y = real income and z = other demand shifters including the real 
user cost of housing, uc and credit constraints, cc.1 2 The own price elasticity of demand is -α 
and the income elasticity is β.   Solving and substituting in for z yields: 
 ( )1ln ln – ln – ln – ln  hp y hs uc ccβ γ δ
α
=       (2) 
 
Plausible priors for the long run elasticities are the central estimates of time series studies cited in 
Meen (2001, p. 129) inter alia, implying a price elasticity α−  around -0.5 and a long-run 
income elasticity β  around 1.3.  As Meen (2001) notes, long-run income elasticity estimates 
tend to be higher in time series than in cross-section studies owing to transactions and other 
adjustment costs. 
Since housing is a durable good, inter-temporal considerations imply that ‘permanent’ 
income and ‘user cost’ are important drivers.  The user cost takes into account that durable goods 
deteriorate, but may appreciate in price and incur an interest cost of financing as well as tax.  The 
usual approximation is that the real user cost is ( )euc hp r t hp hpδ= + + −  , where r is the real 
after-tax interest rate of borrowing, possibly adjusted for risk, δ is the depreciation rate, t is the 
property tax rate and ehp hp   is the expected real rate of capital appreciation.   
Ex-post measures of user costs can be negative if appreciation rates in house price booms 
exceed nominal user costs. An important issue is how to track expected house price appreciation.  
Many studies argue that lagged rates of appreciation are good proxy, suggesting a role for 
extrapolation in the formation of household expectations. We measure real user costs using the 
lagged annual rate of appreciation over the prior 4 years adjusted for an assumed 8 percent cost 
                                                           
1
 Inverse demand functions have a long history going back to a 1909 Danish study cited by Theil (1976). 
2
 Non-housing wealth was insignificant in our models, likely reflecting that (1) non-housing wealth-to-income ratios 
may reflect substitution between housing and non-housing wealth offsetting positive wealth effects and (2) the 
distribution of stock wealth is highly concentrated. Tracy et al. (1999) find that stock wealth was the largest 
component of net wealth for 5% of households and housing wealth, for 60 percent, with net wealth low among the 
remaining 35%.    
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of selling a home.  Our user cost measure uc is always positive making ln uc  defined over the 
sample.  The log transformation implies that at low values, variations in uc  have a more 
powerful effect than at high values, capturing the notion that household become frenzied that 
when appreciation is high relative to tax and interest costs.3  
Other factors may also be relevant for housing demand, given that many mortgage 
borrowers face limits on their borrowing and may be risk averse.  These could include nominal 
as well as real interest rates, demography and proxies for risk, particularly of mortgage default. 
In the dynamics, lagged price adjustment is plausible, given the inefficiency of house prices.4 
The rate of change in the per capita housing stock, as well as its level, also likely helps explain 
house prices.  One interpretation is through expectations: households observing much 
construction might lower expectations of future appreciation.  Another interpretation is in terms 
of prices adjusting both to stock and flow disequilibria, for which error or equilibrium correction 
models are well suited. We implement this strategy by estimating vector error- correction (VEC) 
and autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL), versions of the following house price model: 
( )1 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1 2 3
4 0 ,
ln  ln ln –  ln – ln –  ln
 ln  ln ln ln   
  ln +  
t t t t t t
s t s s t s s t s s t ss j s s
s t s k k t ts k
hp hp y hs uc cc
hp y hs uc
cc z u
α β β β β β
γ γ γ γ
γ γ δ
− − − − −
− − − −
−
∆ = − −
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆
+ ∆ + +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (3) 
with lagged levels and first differences terms, a set of exogenous z variables mainly reflecting 
tax, monetary policy and regulatory factors and a random error term u. 
 
                                                           
3
 Hendry (1984) and Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) include similar ‘frenzy’ effects using a cubic in the recent or 
fitted rate of appreciation. In results not shown, we found that models using ln uc  and models linear in uc , but 
which include a cubic in lagged appreciation, yield similar long run solutions and adjustment speeds. 
4
 Hamilton and Schwab (1985), Case and Shiller (1989, 1990),  Poterba (1991) and Meese and Wallace (1994) find 
that house price changes are positively correlated and past information on housing fundamentals can forecast future 
excess returns. Hamilton and Schwab (1985), Capozza and Seguin (1996) and Clayton (1997) find significant 
evidence against the hypothesis of rational home price expectations.  We find that user costs based on the four-year 
lagged appreciation rate outperformed those based on other lag lengths in LTV and non-LTV models.   
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III. Data  
 The variables used fall into the following categories: house prices and the housing stock, 
permanent income, real user cost of housing, mortgage credit standards, capital gains taxes and 
monetary/regulatory variables. So far, shifts in demographics variables were insignificant or had 
counter-intuitive signs in regressions not shown. We plan to further investigate adding 
demographic effects in future research. 
Houses Prices and the Housing Stock.  We use Freddie Mac data on nominal house prices from 
repeat home sales, t omitting upwardly distorted price appraisals from mortgage refinancings.  
We seasonally adjust this index before deflating it with the personal consumption expenditures 
(PCE) deflator to measure real house prices (HP).  Because shocks to real energy prices can 
temporarily distort this deflator, models include the t and t-1 lags of the change in the log of PCE 
energy prices divided by the non-energy PCE price deflator (∆rpenergy) to clean up residuals 
from relative energy shocks.  The real, per capita housing stock ( hs ) is the Flow of Funds 
estimated replacement cost of household sector residential housing structures deflated by the 
price index for housing construction. 
Permanent Income. Our income measure is an estimate of permanent income, since households 
tend to abstract from temporary income fluctuations and buy housing and other durable goods 
based on expected future income.  We base the proxy on per capita real non property disposable 
income. Non property income is the sum of labor and transfer income adjusted for temporary tax 
effects (see Blinder and Deaton), deflated by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) 
deflator.5 Non-property income (Y) is used because it accords with theory and avoid simultaneity 
bias by omitting property income, which reflects property values. Our permanent income 
measure pY equals the discounted path of expected non-property income over a finite horizon.   
                                                           
5
 These include the tax surcharges during the Vietnam War, temporary tax cuts in 1975, 2001, 2005 and 2008; but 
not Blinder and Deaton’s estimates for the phase-in of the tax cuts of the early 1980s. The details are available upon 
request. We also net out the impact of the new Medicare part D drug benefit on transfer income since 2006q1. 
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 We estimate equations for the deviation of log ‘permanent’ income from log current 
income: ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1ln ln lnp K s K st t s t t s s tY Y E Y Yδ δ− −= + =≈ ∑ ∑ − , a weighted moving average of forward-
looking income growth rates, see Campbell (1997). Permanent income was constructed using a 
40 quarter horizon ( 40K = ) and a 10% quarterly discount rate ( 0.1δ = ), consistent with the view 
that households view the future with a high degree of uncertainty.   
For expectations of the deviation of permanent income from current income, we use a 
simple model based on reversion to a split trend (with a slow-down in growth from 1968) with 
just two economic drivers. These are the four-quarter change in the 3 month Treasury bill yield, 
3mTBill , representing the impact of monetary policy, and a Michigan survey measure of consumer 
expectations ( ICE ).  This has the advantage of being based on a survey of actual consumers.6 
The estimated model for ( ) ( )1 11 1ln ln lnperm K s K st s t s s tY Y Yδ δ− −= + =∆ ≡ ∑ ∑ −  is: 
  
 68 3
(18.6) (17.4) (13.0) (10.9) (5.6) (6.8)
ln 0.917 0.533ln 0.0054 0.0033 0.0024 4 0.00048perm mt t t tY Y t t Tbill ICE∆ = − + − − ∆ +
 
 
with 2 0.87, 0.0094R SE= = and sample period 1961q1 to 2006q4. The variables t and 68t are a 
time trend and split time trend respectively. The fitted or forecast (2007q1 onwards) values of 
ln permtY∆  are used to construct ln ptY , our measure of permanent income. 
Real User Cost of Housing. The real user cost ( uc ) is the after-tax sum of the effective 
conventional mortgage interest rate  and the property tax rate from the Federal Reserve Board 
(FRB) model plus the FRB depreciation rate for housing minus the annualized home price 
appreciation over the four prior years, adjusted for an assumed 8 percent cost of selling a home. 
                                                           
6
 The model for permanent income was derived from a more general model including changes in the unemployment 
rate and the log real S&P 500 index, but these had ‘wrong’ signs or were insignificant. 
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The resulting real user cost is exceeds zero in the sample, allowing real user costs to enter in 
logs, an appealing aspect for reasons stressed by Meen (2001).7  
We also adjust the real user cost for the impact of the first-time homebuyer tax credit in 
2009.  This credit equalled 10% of a home’s sales price, with the credit capped at $8,000 or 
about 3.3 percent of the average price of existing single-family homes sold in the four quarters 
(2007q4 to 2008q3) before expectations that the credit would become law.  First-time buyers, on 
average, bought homes that were 20% less expensive than the average price of homes purchased 
according to the 2005 American Housing Survey.  Applying this 20% adjustment implies that the 
credit equalled about 4.1 percent of the price of homes bought by first-time home-buyers.   
The tax credit was passed in the first quarter of 2009 and was extended for sales through 
June 2010.  To model this, we reduced the real user cost of housing 4.11 percentage points for 
2008q4 to 2010q2.  This basically treats the tax credit as having an effect proportional to its 
impact on real user costs facing the marginal (i.e. first-time) home buyer.  The treatment of the 
2008q4 reading reflects the t-1 dating on the level and first first-difference term on real user costs 
in the model. In other regressions, we found that not adjusting the real user cost in this way led to 
poorer model fits and slower estimated speeds of adjustments in the LTV and non-LTV models. 
Mortgage Credit Standards. Mortgage credit standards are tracked by the average LTV for 
homes bought by first-time home buyers (Duca, Johnson, Muellbauer and Murphy, 2010), based 
on American Housing Survey data since 1979. This series consistently measures LTV ratios on 
conventional mortgages, which corresponds to the Freddie Mac house price series that is based 
on homes bought with conforming conventional mortgages. This LTV series shifted up, from 
around 85% in the late 1970s and the 1980s to about 87 percent in the 1990s (Figure 1), before 
jumping after 2002.  The rise in the LTV ratio in the early 1990s coincided with Congressional 
                                                           
7
 Some autoregressive distributed lag or ARDL models split the user cost term into nominal user cost and 
appreciation terms to assess issues regarding speculation. However, this approach increases the size, and possibly 
the number, of the estimated cointegrating vectors when using a vector error-correction (VEC) models.  
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directives to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase homeownership by funding more low 
down-payment mortgages (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2010). 
We adjust raw quarterly AHS LTV data for two reasons.  First, we adjust the raw data for 
seasonality, some unusually small quarterly samples and shifts in regional composition. These 
latter two factors introduce noise from which we wish to abstract. Second, we examined whether 
LTVs were endogenous to several macroeconomic variables over 1979-2007, finding no 
significant link with income and interest rates but a statistical link with changes in the overall 
unemployment rate (UR).  We used the Kalman filter and a local level model with fixed 
seasonals and a range of explanatory variables, including the change in the civilian 
unemployment rate ( civUR∆ ), the share of first time buyers in the West region (West ) and 
dummies for the quarter following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack ( 9/11D ) and last two 
quarters of 1989, corresponding to the Savings and Loan / Thrift bailout ( &S LD ).   
The estimated model is: 
  9 49/11 &
1 1(3.4) (2.4) (3.0) (3.5)
0.027 0.074 0.060 0.052civ S Lt t j kt t t t j kj kLTV Level UR West D D d D s S= == − ∆ + − − + +∑ ∑

 
with 2 0.65, 0.02, 1.84R SE DW= = = ,  t stats are in parentheses and the sample period is 1979q1 to 
2009q2. The ratio of the estimated variances of the level to the irregular variances is 0.083.  

tLevel  is the estimated stochastic trend, the 'sjD  are a series of dummies for small sample 
quarters, when credit was tight and the 'skS  are fixed seasonal dummies. The positive coefficient 
on West  plausibly reflects the impact of higher house prices in that region on preferences with 
respect to LTV ratios, as well as the tendency for faster house price appreciation which may 
make lenders feel comfortable with smaller down-payment cushions. The dummy variables for 
quarters with less than 20 observations - 1981q4, 1982q2 to q4, 1983q4, 1993q4, 2005q4, 
2007q4 and 2008q4 - were all significant at the 10% level or better. Our adjusted first-time buyer 
LTV measure consists of the smoothed level and estimated residual from our model. We then 
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took a three-quarter, weighted average of the resulting series, using quarters t through t-2, where 
the weights were the relative share of observations in each of the three quarters.  This smoothes 
the series, with the observation weights treating individual borrowers equally. 
The 2000 to 2005 rise in LTV ratios likely reflects two financial innovations that fostered 
the securitized financing of riskier mortgages.  The adoption of credit scoring technology 
enabled lenders to sort nonprime borrowers and attempt to price the risk of nonprime mortgages.  
Since these loans were too risky for banks to hold, they were funded by securities markets, where 
investor demand for the mortgage-backed securities funding nonprime loans was temporarily 
boosted by two unusual developments.  The first was the combination of low interest rates and 
expanded credit availability in the early 2000s fueled a rise in house prices that plausibly led 
investors and analysts to under-estimate the default risk on nonprime mortgages.  As Duca, et al. 
(2010) illustrate, the short history of subprime mortgages over 1998-2006 may have tempted 
analysts to forecast problem loans on labor market conditions while not having enough sample to 
disentangle the impacts of house prices and interest rates.  In addition, the tendency for vintages 
of Alt A mortgages to have progressively higher proportions of no- or low-documentation of 
income (Credit Suisse, 2007) and to post progressively worsening loan quality (Mayer, Pence 
and Sherlund, 2009) suggests that an errors-in-variables problem from overstatements of 
borrower income contributed to the underestimation of nonprime mortgage defaults.     
The financial innovations that sorted borrowers or funded their loans were accompanied 
by a second major development - changes in regulations and public policies leading to non-
cyclical increases in the demand for the securities funding these mortgages.  This included a 
2004 SEC decision that doubled the 1935 limits on investment bank leverage from 15:1 to 33:1 
and the rise of hedge funds and SIVs that used short-duration debt to fund risky long positions in 
nonprime mortgages.  Also important were large purchases of nonprime MBS by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac to meet their public policy goals of expanding home ownership (Frame, 2008) 
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even though they did not issue much nonprime MBS.  Technological and policy innovations 
fostered originations of nonprime mortgages, which were sold to the GSEs or private investors in 
the form of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or with protection from credit default swaps 
(CDSs).  The later failure of CDOs to protect investors from unanticipated defaults and the 
soaring cost of using CDSs led to a collapse in the funding and availability of nonprime 
mortgages.  As a result, the LTV ratio for first-time buyers fell, partially reversing increases of 
the early to mid 2000’s. 
Capital Gains Taxes. Although income tax rates are in the user cost of capital variable, capital 
gains tax changes have notably affected house prices.  Before mid 1997, net capital gains on 
home sales were taxable for households under age 55, if the seller did not purchase a home of 
equal or greater value.  The Tax Reform Act of 1997, passed in the second quarter of 1997, 
largely eliminated this tax by exempting the first $500,000 ($250,000) of gains for married 
(single) filers, raising the after-tax value of homes and encouraging turnover (Cunningham and 
Englehardt, 2008). To control for this, we included a variable ( CGT ) equal to 1 since 1997q4 
and 0 before.8  The 1997q4 timing reflects the 1-2 month lag between the signing and actual 
settlement (when house prices are recorded) of home sale contracts and the t-1 lag on levels 
variables in the VEC and ARDL models.          
Monetary and Regulatory Variables. One variable (MoneyTarget) equals 1 over the money 
targeting regime of 1979q4 to 1982q3, which likely reduced the supply of or demand for 
mortgages by raising interest rate uncertainty.  Another is REGQ, Duca’s (1996) measure of how 
much Regulation Q ceilings on deposit interest rates were binding until the controls ended.  We 
include the two quarter change, REGQt-1 - REGQt-3, to control for short-run negative short-run 
disintermediation effects (Jaffee and Rosen, 1979) not consistently tracked by user costs (Duca 
and Wu, 2009) and to control for a particular aspect of financial liberalization.   
                                                           
8
 We exclude the tax depreciation period for rental properties because it had non-robust effects in other runs.  
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Another variable controls for an large rise in the upfront insurance premium for Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) loans which provide government guarantees against losses to 
lenders.9 A rise in the upfront premium (from 0 to 3.8% of the mortgage principal) was 
announced to take effect in late 1983q3, inducing many renters to leave rental housing and 
purchase “starter” homes in that quarter.  This hike was later partially reduced by smaller 
premium cuts that were too small to be significant.  We include a dummy equal to 1 in 1983q3 
and 0 otherwise (∆FHAFee) to control for the large, induced jump in house prices that quarter.  
 
IV. Econometric Results 
In this Section, we present our cointegrating model results. The data have unit roots so 
we estimate vector error correction (VEC) models, as well as simpler autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) models. The VEC models are estimated in two stages. In the first stage, the long-run 
cointegrating regressions are estimated using the Johansen (1991, 1995) method. The second 
stage is akin to second step of the Engle-Granger (1987) procedure.  
In both types of models, we control for a variety of tax effects - beyond using income and 
property tax rates in calculating the user cost of housing- and for the money targeting regime of 
1979-1982 that imparted more interest rate risk to house prices beyond that reflected in simple 
user cost of capital variables.  By addressing such factors, we try to avoid omitted variable bias 
that can obscure long-term, qualitative relationships and lead to poorly estimated coefficients. 
The VEC results in the upper panel of Table 1 set out the long-run, unique cointegrating 
relationship, corresponding to equation (2), between house prices, permanent income, the real 
user cost of housing, the housing stock and our credit proxy, the adjusted LTV ratio for first time 
                                                           
9
 Until 2007, FHA loans had size limits well below those on ‘conventional’ mortgages. 
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buyers. Columns 1 and 2 exclude the latter variable, whereas columns 3 and 4 include it.10.  Each 
model includes the monetary targeting, Regulation Q, FHA fees and capital gains tax regime 
controls as exogenous variables. Our models are estimated over two samples. Models 2 and 5 are 
estimated over the complete sample 1981q2 to 2009q3. Models 1 and 4 were estimated over a 
shorter sample ending in 2002q2, just after the large temporary swings in income and other 
variables from the September 11 terror attacks and just before LTV ratios rose during the 
subprime boom starting in 2002. The lag lengths of the VEC models were chosen to generate (at 
most) a unique, significant cointegrating vector and clean residuals where possible.   
Although cointegrating vectors with the expected signs are found for both the non-LTV 
and LTV models, the latter are better in several ways.  First, the LTV variable is correctly signed 
and highly significant, consistent with our view that the adjusted, first time buyer LTV ratio is 
proxying credit constraints and the house price-to-rent model results in Duca et al. (2011). 
Second, there is stronger evidence of cointegration in the full sample from the maximal 
eigenvalue statistics when the LTV ratio is included. In addition, the long-run housing stock 
variable is more significant in the full sample LTV model versus the non-LTV model.  Third, 
including LTV ratios yields more plausible elasticities, especially in the full sample. The inverse 
of the coefficient on log housing stock, interpretable as the long run price elasticity of demand, is 
between -0.48 to -0.57, which is smack in the middle of the range of cross-section and time 
series estimates reported in Meen (2001).  Contrast these with the price elasticity estimates of 
 -0.58 and -0.76 in the non-LTV models.  Furthermore, the implied income elasticity of housing 
demand – the ratio of the estimated, long run coefficients on log income and log housing stock – 
range between 1.35 and 1.36 in the LTV models and 1.53 to 1.57 in the non-LTV models. The 
former are closer to the time series estimates reported in the literature.  
                                                           
10
 In the long run cointegratimg regressions, the log LTV ratio enters with a one period lag. This lag improved 
model fit, perhaps reflecting a time delay before first-time homebuyers learn of changes in less visible down-
payment constraints.   
 17 
Another advantage of the LTV models vis-à-vis the non-LTV models is that the implied 
equilibrium levels of real house prices line up somewhat better with actual real house prices.  
This can be seen from equilibrium values constructed from coefficients estimated over the 
shorter sample period ending in 2002q2 to 2009q3, as shown in Figure 2. Here the four-quarter 
lag of equilibrium log levels from the LTV models more closely line up with actual real house 
prices, when LTVs fell during the credit crunch period of the early 1990s and when LTVs surged 
during the subprime boom of 2003 to 2006. 
LTV models also outperform non-LTV models in their ability to track short-term changes 
in real house prices (lower panel, Table 1).  In short-run models, the monetary regime, REGQ, 
and capital gains variables are significant with expected signs, while the FHA variable is 
marginally significant in the models, except in the full sample non-LTV model.  The coefficients 
on lagged changes in the per capita housing stocks tend to be negative, as expected, and in line 
with UK results (Cameron et al., 2006).  The income dynamics are consistent with a moving 
average of income.  The dynamics in log real user cost also imply a moving average.  Short run 
dynamics in lagged house price changes suggest a positive short term momentum effect, aside 
from that embedded in the real user cost term. 
The LTV models fit somewhat better – their adjusted R2’s are .01 to .03 higher and 
standard errors are 5 to 14 percent smaller than in the corresponding non-LTV models.  In the 
full sample the LTV model (model 4) has an estimated 11.3% speed of adjustment, which is 
much more plausible than the 5.4% speed in the corresponding non-LTV model (model 2).  
Moreover, the speed of adjustment is stable across the two samples for the LTV models, but not 
for the non-LTV models where the speed of adjustment falls from 15.7% to 5.4%.  A plausible 
interpretation of the better long and short-run performance of the LTV models is that non-LTV 
models omit information about credit standards, which were an important driver, along with real 
interest rates, of the recent boom and bust in U.S. house prices.   
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Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models. As a check, we estimated ARDL models over the full 
sample, with and without our LTV variables.11  Although the VECM results are generally 
preferable, it is reassuring that the estimated long-run elasticities of housing demand and speeds 
of adjustment (the coefficient on lagged real house prices) in the two ARDL are similar to those 
from their VEC counterparts. For brevity, we show only the ARDL LTV model results in 
column 5. The non-LTV ARDL results are available upon request.   
Exogeneity. A natural question is whether the LTV series is endogenous. If the LTV series were 
driven by house prices, this would greatly complicate and alter the interpretation of our findings.  
In the full sample, complete VEC system underlying the Column (4) results, the house price 
error correction term is insignificant (t statistic of -0.99) in the LTV equation, indicating that the 
LTV ratio is weakly exogenous to the other variables, as is the case for the real user cost (t-
statistic of -0.89), permanent income (t-statistic of 1.34) and the housing stock (t-statistic of -
                                                           
11
 The specification of the ARDL models is slightly different from that of the ARDL models. In particular, a more 
parsimonious set of lagged first difference terms are used. Further details are available on request.  
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1.47).  Thus, consistent with theory, equilibrium house prices are indeed driven by shifting credit 
standards as well as changes in income, user costs and the housing stock.  
The 2009 First Time Buyer Tax Credit. In order to gauge the effect of the tax credit, we 
estimated the LTV model in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 up to 2008q4, the period before the tax 
credit appears in the lagged real user cost terms. We then dynamically simulated the model with 
and without the tax credit. The simulation results suggest that the tax credit had a significant 
positive effect on the level and time path of house prices – house prices might have fallen 
(undershot) by as much as 10% more by the end of 2010, and stayed lower for longer, without 
the temporary tax credit. The results reflect the ‘bubble builder’ and ‘bubble burster’ features of 
our error correction house price model (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996). 
Results Using the Loan Performance Measure of House Prices. As a robustness check, we also 
estimated inverted demand models using a median single family house price series from Loan 
Performance, covering all securitized mortgages - including more subprime and other nonprime 
mortgages than the Freddie Mac series.12  The Loan Performance (LP) data cover a slightly 
shorter sample (we lose 1981) and display more pronounced and somewhat faster swings in 
house prices albeit similar long-run trends.13 The LP data imply faster house price appreciation 
resulting in negative real user costs in the mid-2000s.  This means that we have to use the level, 
rather than the log, of the user cost to model the LP house price series.  
 The tendency for the Loan Performance house prices series to move more quickly than 
the Freddie Mac series reflects the fact that the LP series includes more thinly traded low-end 
homes (financed with nonconforming subprime and FHA loans) and high-end homes (financed 
with jumbo and alternative A loans).  Likely reflecting this timing difference, we found that only 
the time t change in relative energy prices was significant.  Because the FHA and capital gains 
                                                           
12
 This series excludes the prices of repossessed homes or homes sold in short-sales, because the sellers of such 
homes have very different incentives and time horizons from those of owner-occupiers.  
13
 The shorter sample forces us to drop the RegQ variable, which has its last non-zero reading in 1981.  
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tax dummies were insignificant, we dropped them.  To handle a large positive outlier in 2009q2 
we added a dummy (TaxCredit) for this quarter. This variable is significant in both the non-LTV 
and LTV LP models (columns 6 and 7 of Table 1), with coefficients suggesting a ceteris paribis 
4½ to 5 percentage point jump in prices, consistent with the passage of the tax credit legislation 
in 2009q2, with retrospective provisions for 2009q1.  
It is very reassuring that, using the Loan Performance house price data, the LTV ratio is 
highly significant and exogenous to our VEC system (Column 7, Table 1), the same as in the 
LTV models using Freddie Mac data (Columns 3 to 5).  As before, including the LTV ratio 
yields a unique cointegrating vector, improves model fit and results in a much faster quarterly 
speed of adjustment (9.0%) than in its non-LTV counterpart (3.4%, column 6).  The implied 
long-run income elasticity is also similar to the estimates based on the Freddie Mac house price 
series, although the estimates should be interpreted carefully since the user cost terms are not 
logged.  The LP data are more volatile than the Freddie Mac data, so it is not surprising that the 
fit of the LP models is poorer. For example, the adjusted R2 in column 7 is 8 percentage point 
lower than in column 5, whilst the equation standard error is twice as large.  
 
V. Where Are House Prices Heading?  
To shed light on how much U.S. house prices may be overvalued, we now examine the 
implications of our house price models for the deviations of prices from their ‘equilibrium’ or 
‘long-run’ values.  There is more than one concept of equilibrium.  The narrow concept is 
conditional on the observed log real user cost as used in our econometric models.  Consider the 
VEC results in Column (4) of Table 1.  The long run solution is lnhp = 4.71 -0.21lnuc + 2.80lnyp 
– 2.07lnhs + 0.97lnLTV. Conditional on lnuc, the deviation from equilibrium is lnhp – (4.71 -
0.21lnuc + 2.80lnyp – 2.07lnhs + 0.97lnLTV).  Using such measures, real house prices were over-
valued in 2009q3 by about 10% in both the LTV (column 5) and non-LTV (column 2) models.   
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An advantage of LTV models is their better ability to pin down long-run house prices as 
implied by the partly dynamic, out-of-sample forecasts generated using the short sample (1981q2 
to 2002q2) models.  The forecasts are partly dynamic since we assume that house prices at time 
t-2 are known and house prices at time t -1 are the model forecasts from last period. This dating 
structure is consistent with the reporting lags in the Freddie Mac house price series that we use.  
As shown in Figure 3, near the height of the house price boom, the LTV and non-LTV models 
have similar, reasonably-sized misses, with the former tending to over-predict and the latter to 
under-predict house prices in the mid-2000s. However, since late 2008 the LTV model tracks 
actual house prices more closely, while the non-LTV model is persistently off.  This is especially 
true if one assumes that LTVs stabilized near their 2009q2 levels and one extends the forecast to 
2010q2, the latest period for which we have actual house price data. 
Another way to assess possible overvaluation is to forecast house prices out-of-sample 
(post 2009q3) using the full sample estimates in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 1. In order to do 
this, we have to specify reasonable values for future income, the housing stock, interest rates, 
loan to value ratios, etc...  We assume that LTVs remain at 2009q2 levels.  Actual non-LTV data 
are used through 2010q2.  Non-property income is assumed to grow in line with average 
personal income growth forecasts from the October and November 2010 Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators survey of forecasters.  We based a path for the real housing stock off private sector 
projections that total housing starts would return to a long-run equilibrium pace of 1.4 million 
units in early 2012, up from the current 0.6 million units.14  We assume that the tax credit for 
home-buyers expired in 2010q2 for good, but keep depreciation and other tax variables at their 
2010q2 levels.  These assumptions are combined with average forecasts of mortgage interest 
                                                           
14
 We assume starts are at a 0.6 million unit annual pace through 2010q4, and then rise 0.05 million per quarter until 
reaching 1.4 million units in 2014q4.  From this pace, we construct a shortfall of starts from their long-run pace (1.4 
million units), which averaged 0.8 million per quarter over 2008q3 to 2010q2.  Lagging one quarter for time to build 
lags, the real per capita housing stock fell by 0.23845 percent per quarter from 2008q4 to 2010q2, or by 0.23845/.8 
percent per 0.1 million shortfall in housing starts.  Using this ratio and projected shortfalls in housing starts, the real 
per capita housing stock falls until 2013q1 and we assume it rises in line with per capita real income thereafter. 
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rates from the December 2010 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts to construct a nominal user cost 
path.   
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We use one-quarter lagged forecasts of house prices to construct the appreciation series 
used to convert the nominal into a real user cost series.  Because an error-correction model is 
used, with lagged house price change and real user cost terms, where the latter are constructed 
using the annualized changes in house prices over the prior four years, the model captures the 
‘bubble builder’ and ‘bubble burster’ dynamics emphasised by Abraham and Hendershott 
(1996), inter alia.   
Using the assumptions set out above, the dynamic simulations from the LTV model 
imply that nominal house prices may fall 8 percent further from their simulated 2010q2 levels 
before hitting bottom in 2011q4 (Figure 4), with real prices falling 10 percent by 2012q1.15  The 
declines are less dramatic in the non-LTV models - nominal house prices only fall 6 percent 
                                                           
15
 This result is not far from the simulated 5 percent decline in nominal house prices that we discussed in an early 
draft of our related house price-to-rent paper (Duca et al., 2011). 
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below their simulated 20102q levels in 2011q4, whilst real house prices bottom out 8 percent 
below their simulated 2010q2 levels.  In the three quarters following 2009q3 for which we have 
actual house price data, the LTV and non-LTV model simulations straddle actual prices, with the 
LTV model tracking a little better.  Partial data for 2010q3 suggest a notable decline in nominal 
house prices that is closer to the level generated by the LTV model.  In the simulations, the 
nominal level of the Freddie Mac house price series only reverts to its 2007q2 subprime boom 
peak in late 2014 / early 2015. 
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The simulations, of course, are based on projections of house price determinants which 
are hard to predict. One source of such uncertainty stems from changes in public policy.  Inter 
alia, changes in foreclosure policies could affect the speed at which house prices adjust.  Another 
source stems from changes in federal mortgage programs.  Before 2008, FHA mortgage size 
limits were lower than those on conventional mortgages securitized by Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae. In the spring of 2008, when jumbo and conventional mortgage issuance dried up as jumbo 
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lenders and the GSE’s tightened credit standards, the FHA increased the maximum size of the 
loans it guarantees against default risk to the limits used by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in most 
mortgage markets and up to $729,750 in high-priced markets.  This effect may not be captured 
by our LTV measure which omits FHA mortgages (since the number of first time buyers with 
FHA mortgages in the AHS was very small).  In addition, the FHA’s share of mortgage 
originations rose from 15 percent or so before 2008 to about 50 percent by late 2008.   
 To explore the possible impact of these effects, we adjusted our LTV series upwards in 
two ways.  The first is to add to our series the increase in the difference between the average 
overall LTV ratio and the average LTV ratio on private (non-FHA, non-Veterans 
Administration) mortgages for first-time buyers after 2008q2.  This amounted to about ¾ of one 
percentage point, which was added to our LTV ratio starting in 2008q2 to create LTVFHA1.  The 
second is a calculation of a weighted FHA and private mortgage LTV ratio.  For this we assume 
that the minimum down-payment on FHA mortgages is 3½%, to which we add a 2% upfront 
insurance premium, implying an effective 5.5% minimum down-payment or 94.5% LTV ratio.  
The 35 percentage point increase in the FHA shares of mortgages implies that, at the end of 
2008, FHA mortgages constituted about 41.2 percent of the formerly conventional and jumbo 
first time buyer mortgages.  Our weighted average LTV, LTVFHA2, was calculated by applying 
the 94.5% effective LTV ratio on FHA mortgages to the 41.2% share and the observed average 
LTV ratio on private mortgages to the remaining 58.8% share. The simulated time path of house 
prices is similar to that shown in Figure 4, except that real house prices fall by about 1% less 
using LTVFHA1 and by about 2½% less using LTVFHA2.    
We believe that the simulation results are reasonably robust to alternative formulations of 
house prices and to endogenizing housing supply, but we have not yet completed our analysis of 
these issues.  For these reasons, the simulation results should be treated with caution. 
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VI. Conclusion  
In the inverted demand approach, credit standards for first-time home-buyers are 
important determinants of house prices, along with income, real user costs and the housing stock.  
Our findings indicate that swings in credit standards played a major, if not the major, role in 
driving the boom and bust of real U.S. house prices in the first decade of this century.  Long-
term movements in mortgage credit standards for the marginal home-buyer have not generally 
been tracked and incorporated in standard time series models of U.S. house prices.  
Consequently, such models are mis-specified and may not track house prices well during periods 
of shifting credit standards.  In contrast, models including a cyclically adjusted LTV measure for 
first time home-buyers have much better short- and long-run properties.  These range from faster 
speeds of adjustment to better model fits and more sensible and plausible long-run elasticities of 
housing demand.  Overall, our findings fit with the view that many asset bubbles are fueled by 
unsustainable increases in the availability of credit or in the use of non-robust financial practices. 
 26 
References 
Abraham, Jesse M. and Patric H. Hendershott, (1996), “Bubbles in Metropolitan Housing 
Markets”, Journal of Housing Research, 7, 191–207. 
Bardhan, Ashok D., Robert E. Edelstein and Cynthia A. Kroll (2009), “The Housing Problem 
and the Economic Crisis: A Review and Evaluation of Policy Prescriptions,” Fisher 
Center Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley.   
Blinder, Alan and Angus Deaton (1985), “The Time Series Consumption Function Revisited,”  
 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1985(2), 465-511.  
Cameron, Gavin, John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy (2006), “Was There a British House 
Price Bubble? Evidence from a Regional Panel”, CEPR discussion paper no. 5619. 
Capozza, Dennis and Paul Seguin (1996), “Expectations, Efficiency and Euphoria in the Housing 
Market”, Regional Science and Urban Economics 26, 369-86. 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller (1989), “The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family 
Homes”, American Economic Review 79, 125-37. 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller (1990), “Forecasting Prices and Excess Returns in the 
Housing Market”, Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics 
Association, 18, 253-73.  
Clayton, Jim (1997), “Are Housing Price Cycles Driven by Irrational Expectations?”, Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics 14, 341-63.  
Credit Suisse (2007), “Mortgage Quality Du Jour: Underestimated No More”, March 13, 2007. 
Cunningham, Christopher R. and Gary V. Englehardt (2008), “Housing Capital-Gains Taxation 
and Homeowner Mobility: Evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997”, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 63(3) 803-15. 
Davis, Morris A. and Jonathan Heathcote (2005), “The Price and Quantity of Residential Land in 
the United States”, International Economic Review, 46, 751-84.   
DiMartino, Danielle and Duca, John V. (2007), “The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages”,  
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter, November.  
Doms, Mark and John Krainer (2007), “Innovations in Mortgage Markets and Increased 
Spending on Housing”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco working paper no. 05. 
Duca, John V. (1996), “Deposit Deregulation and the Sensitivity of Housing”, Journal of 
Housing Economics, 5(3), 207-26. 
 27 
Duca, John V. (2006), “Making Sense of the U.S. Housing Slowdown”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas Economic Letter, November. 
Duca, John V., Kurt B. Johnson, John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy (2010), “Time Series 
Estimates of U.S. Mortgage Constraints and Regional Home Supply”, mimeo, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Duca, John V., John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy (2009), “The Financial Crisis and 
Consumption”, mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Duca, John V., John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy (2010), “Housing Markets and the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Lessons for the Future”, Journal of Financial Stability 6, 
203-17. 
Duca, John V., John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy (2011), “House Prices and Credit 
Constraints: Making Sense of the U.S. Experience”, The Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
Duca, John V. and Tao Wu (2009), “Regulation and the Neo-Wicksellian Approach to Monetary 
Policy”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(3), 799-807. 
Engle, Robert F. and Clive W. J. Granger (1987), “Cointegration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation and Testing”, Econometrica, 55, 251–76. 
Frame, W. Scott (2008), “The 2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac,” Journal of Applied Finance, 18(2), 124-36. 
Gallin, Joshua (2006), “The Long-Run Relationship between Home Prices and Income: Evidence 
from Local Housing Markets”, Real Estate Economics, 34(3), 417-38. 
Gabriel, Stuart A. and Stuart S. Rosenthal (2010), “Do the GSE’s Expand the Supply of 
Mortgage Credit? New Evidence of Crowd Out in the Secondary Mortgage Market”, 
mimeo, 2010 AEA Annual Conference presentation. 
Geanakoplos, John (2010), “Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle”, New 
York Federal Reserve Economic Policy Review, 16(1), 101-31. 
Hamilton, Bruce and Robert Schwab (1985), “Expected Appreciation in Urban Housing 
Markets”, Journal of Urban Economics, 18, 103-18. 
Hendry, David F. (1984). “Econometric modelling of house prices in the United Kingdom”, in 
David F. Hendry and Kenneth F. Wallis (eds), Econometrics and Quantitative 
Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Himmelberg, Charles, Chris Mayer and Todd Sinai (2005), “Assessing High House Prices: 
Bubbles, Fundamentals and Misperceptions”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 
Winter, 67-92.     
 28 
Jaffee, Dwight M. and Ken Rosen (1979), “Mortgage Credit Availability and Residential 
Construction Activity”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 333-86. 
Johansen, Soren (1991), “Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in 
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models”, Econometrica, 59, 1551–80. 
Johansen, Soren (1995), Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive 
Models, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mayer, Christopher, Karen Pence and Shane M. Sherlund (2009), “The Rise in Mortgage 
 Defaults”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23, Winter, 27-50. 
Meen, Geoffrey (2001), Modeling Spatial Housing Markets: Theory, Analysis and Policy, 
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Meese, Richard and Nancy Wallace (1994), “Testing the Present Value Relation for Housing 
Prices: Should I Leave My House in San Francisco?”, Journal of Urban Economics, 35, 
245-66. 
Muellbauer, John and Anthony Murphy (1997), “Booms and Busts in the U.K. Housing Market”, 
The Economic Journal, 107, 1701–27 
Poterba, James (1991), “House Price Dynamics: the Role of Tax Policy and Demography”,  
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 143-203. 
Smith, Margaret Huang and Gary Smith (2006), “Bubble, Bubble, Where’s the Housing 
Bubble?”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 37, 1-68. 
Theil, Henri, (1976), Theory and Measurement of Consumer Demand, Studies in Mathematical 
and Managerial Economics, Vol. 21, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Tracy, Joseph, Henry Schneider and Sewin Chan (1999), “Are Stocks Overtaking Real Estate in 
Household Portfolios?”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in 
Economics and Finance, 5(5), 1-6. 
Table 1: Vector Error Correction and Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models of the 
Change in Real U.S. Log House Prices, ln hp∆  
 
 Maximum likelihood systems estimates of the long-run equilibrium relationship 0 1 2ln ln + lnpt t thp y hsβ β β= + +  
3 4 1ln lnt t tuc LTV uβ β −+ + ,using a 4 (no LTV terms) or 5 (with LTV terms) equation system with at most one 
cointegrating vector, apart from the normalized ARDL results in column (5). 
 
Data Freddie Mac  Freddie Mac  Loan Performance (LP) 
LTV Terms No LTV Terms  With LTV Terms  No LTV LTV 
Type of Model  VEC VEC  VEC VEC ARDL  VEC VEC 
Sample 81q2- 02q2 81q2-09q3  81q2-02q2 81q2-09q3 81q2-09q3  82q1-09q3 82q1-09q3 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
          
Constant 3.792 4.143  4.893 4.711 -    0.790 4.304 
lnuct-1 /uct-1 (LP) -0.198** -0.248**  -0.240**  -0.211** -0.210**   -0.005  -0.023** 
 (12.39)  (14.21)  (14.53)  (23.43) (5.02)   (0.52)  (5.83) 
1ln
p
ty −  2.627**  2.064**  2.378**  2.796**  2.571**     5.950**    3.508** 
 (6.38)  (3.12)  (4.61)  (7.92) (3.44)   (2.16)  (3.48) 
lnhst-1 -1.715** -1.314*  -1.747**  -2.071** -1.859**   -3.896**   -2.679** 
 (5.04)  (2.31)  (3.99)  (6.69) (3.10)   (2.14)  (3.48) 
lnLTVt-2 - -  1.189** 0.967**  0.712**  -   2.893** 
    (4.78) (5.45) (2.44)   (4.77) 
Elasticities:-          
 Income   1.53  1.57   1.36  1.35  1.38   1.53  1.31 
 Price  -0.58 -0.76  -0.57 -0.48 -0.54  -0.26 -0.37 
          
Trace Stats:          
  1 Vector   70.83**   58.28**    98.56**  101.08** -     54.60**    83.04** 
  2 Vectors  24.41 27.16  46.99 47.46 -   20.00 41.22 
λ Max Stats:           
  1 Vector   46.42**  31.12*   51.57**   53.62** -     34.59**   41.82** 
  2 Vectors  19.73 16.11  25.97 22.74 -  12.30 22.53 
 
OLS estimates of the speed of adjustment and short-run dynamics etc. using the estimated equilibrium correction terms 
in the upper pane, e.g.    0 1 2 3ln ln - ln ln
p
t t t t tEC hp y hs ucβ β β β= − − −   4 1ln tLTVβ −− .  
 
Data Freddie Mac  Freddie Mac  Loan Performance (LP) 
LTV Terms No LTV Terms  With LTV Terms  No LTV LTV 
Type of Model  VEC VEC  VEC VEC ARDL  VEC VEC 
Sample 81q2- 02q2 81q2-09q3  81q2-02q2 81q2-09q3 81q2-09q3  82q1-09q3 82q1-09q3 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
          
Constant 0.001 -0.002  0.003 0.002 0.486**  0.000 0.001 
 (0.48) (1.40)  (1.43) (1.10) (5.00)  (0.00) (0.21) 
ECt-1 -0.157** -0.054**   -0.122** -0.113** -  -0.034** -0.090** 
 (3.58) (3.25)  (5.00) (5.21)   (4.26) (5.07) 
lnhpt-1  - -  - - -0.106**  - - 
      (5.09)    
MoneyTargett -0.005 -0.006+  -0.017** -0.011** -0.012**  -0.009 -0.022** 
 (1.29) (1.90)  (4.13) (3.57) (3.46)  (1.546) (3.22) 
CGTt-2 -0.001 0.001+  0.002* 0.003**  0.004**  - - 
 (0.67) (1.80)  (2.16) (4.28) (2.46)    
∆2REGQt-1 -0.003 -0.005**  -0.004** -0.002* -0.006**  - - 
 (1.44) (3.72)  (2.94) (2.15) (4.35)    
∆FHAFeet 0.001 0.004  0.004+ 0.004+ 0.006*  - - 
 (0.37) (1.48)  (1.94) (1.67) (2.27)    
        Continued Overleaf 
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Data Freddie Mac  Freddie Mac  Loan Performance (LP) 
LTV Terms No LTV Terms  With LTV Terms  No LTV LTV 
Type of Model  VEC VEC  VEC VEC ARDL  VEC VEC 
Sample 81q2- 02q2 81q2-09q3  81q2-02q2 81q2-09q3 81q2-09q3  82q1-09q3 82q1-09q3 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
          
∆lnrpenergyt -0.055** -0.067**  -0.048** -0.064** -0.057**    -0.055**  -0.050** 
 (4.37) (8.77)  (4.16) (9.30) (7.21)  (3.73) (3.42) 
∆lnrpenergyt-1  0.049** 0.048**  0.043** 0.042** 0.037**  -  -  
 (3.11) (4.50)  (2.93) (4.09) (3.42)      
∆lnhpt-1  0.884** 0.974**  0.749** 0.864** 0.876**  0.526** 0.464** 
 (7.46) (11.07)  (7.34) (9.43) (9.76)  (5.41) (4.91) 
∆lnhpt-2 0.008 -0.199+  -0.002 -0.083 -0.170+   0.280** 0.251** 
 (0.06) (1.76)  (0.01) (0.80) (1.67)  (2.44) (2.23) 
∆lnuct-1/∆uct-1(LP) 0.024 0.007    0.017 0.015** 0.017**  0.003*  0.004** 
 (1.61) (1.32)  (1.35) (2.89) (3.15)  (2.04) (2.61) 
∆lnuct-2/∆uct-2(LP) 0.014 -0.004  -0.001 0.007 0.004  0.003     0.003 
 (0.85) (0.77)  (0.09) (1.35) (0.74)  (1.22) (1.37) 
1ln
p
ty −∆  -0.169 0.069  -0.160 -0.142 -0.165  -0.284* -0.369** 
 (1.30) (0.80)  (1.52) (1.46) (1.46)  (1.68) (2.07) 
2ln
p
ty −∆  -0.104 0.155+  0.009 -0.104    -0.067  -0.115     -0.169 
 (0.89) (1.98)  (0.09) (1.14) (0.60)  (0.68) (0.94) 
∆lnhst-1 -0.227 -0.126  -0.458 -0.069    -0.460  0.788 0.645 
 (0.47) (0.34)  (1.16) (0.20) (1.32)  (1.03) (0.85) 
∆lnhst-2 0.243 0.206  0.138 0.052 0.146  -1.583 -1.442 
 (0.42) (0.47)  (0.30) (0.14) (0.36)  (1.69) (1.52) 
∆lnLTVt-2 - -  -0.065 -0.025 -  -    -0.123 
    (1.54) (0.63)    (1.49) 
∆lnLTVt-3 - -  -0.064+ -0.084* -  -     -0.083 
    (1.68) (2.31)    (1.07) 
∆3lnLTVt-2 - -  - - -0.033  - - 
      
(1.27)   
 
          
Adjusted R2 0.893 0.908  0.903 0.933 0.920  0.830 0.846 
S.E.× 100 0.272 0.342  0.259 0.293 0.319  0.649 0.617 
VECLM(1) /LM(1)  23.32 20.28  27.92 27.47   2.21     25.29 28.15 
VECLM(2) /LM(2) 14.48  27.58*  35.69 34.03   1.13     5.78 11.05 
VECLM(8) /LM(8) 23.04 24.28  25.16 31.10   1.43  19.86 24.45 
Q(12) - -  - - 16.54  - - 
          
 
Notes: (i) The superscripts +, * and ** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels respectively. Absolute t-
statistics are shown in parentheses. (ii) LP next to an explanatory refers to the specification of the models (in columns 6 
and 7) that use the Loan Performance house price data. (iii) In the VEC models, the LM statistics are system Lagrange 
Multiplier tests statistics for 1st, 2nd and 8th order AR/MA autocorrelation. (iv) The Freddie Mac non-LTV and LTV 
VEC models 1-4 (columns 1-4) were estimated using 8, 5, 5, and 5 lags of the first differenced terms, respectively. The 
ARDL model (column 5) used 4 lags whilst the models of Loan Performance (Core Logic) house prices (columns 6 and 
7) used 6 lags. Inter alia, the lag lengths were chosen to yield unique cointegrating vectors and clean residuals. (v) To 
save space, the estimated coefficients on the third and higher lags of the first difference terms are not shown. A 
complete set of estimations results is available upon request.  
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